

THE ONTOLOTASK (CRAFT TASK): BETWEEN EMPTINESS AND ILLUSION

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**making as a state of being
over doing pointing towards
the nothingness that *is* being**

Out of the void left from the removal of 'self' (or at very least a withdrawal¹ from the meaning attached to a 'self' concept), sprouts the ontolotask – tentative evidence of our inexorable facticity as matter and the

¹ This movement is also a retraction into the self away from the mask of persona and *into* the nothingness behind it, which is self.

paradoxical dialectic of overcoming this by embodying it. In short, the ontolotask is an iteration of being within the limitations of relativity. The ontolotask is a manifestation of relative nothingness which, though it can only ever be relative, can however point towards an absolute, notwithstanding that the making of *anything* denies any absolute that the ontolotask may presume to point towards. It denies it by diminishing it; it is in effect an anthropomorphisation and is inherently linked to the self or ego which is precisely what the ontolotask sets out to overcome.

If the terms of the absolute (set out here for the purposes of this argument) are stated as 'All There Is Already Exists', to re-present this by means of *making something* would be to stand in radical contradiction to those very terms. It would then seem more appropriate to *point out* this absolute where it *already* exists rather than create something specific, the doing of which would undermine the very standpoint being established. This is the ongoing conflict between the action of making and the purpose (which is in fact an utterance of meaninglessness) of the task. It is the very presence of this conflict that keeps the purpose of tasking active and vigilant. What a pointing out or towards does is recognise the absolute without attempting to understand it by means of a definition which is accepted as impossible and contradictory, without capturing it or colonising it through a process of rationalisation; in short, arriving at an understanding of non-understanding.

When Keiji Nishitani, a leading exponent of the (so-called for purposes of convenience) Kyoto School of Philosophy, poses the question "for what purpose is religion?" he poses the counter question: "For what purpose do I myself exist?"² the answering of which he presents as being the only way to answer the first. This is in fact a question that is present in all other questions and I think it is in itself an answer to all those 'other' questions. There is however not *one* answer to *that* question. It is suggested by Nishitani that the question "For what purpose do I exist?" is much more approachable after an edifying foray into the boundlessness of absolute nothingness. It is only when one has come face to face with oneself from behind that true understanding can begin. Once it is seen that not only is the self everywhere that one looks but it is also always the self looking, which means from the standpoint of the self or a "person-centred self-

² Keiji Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), 2.

prehension of person"³ as Nishitani so aptly puts it, nothing outside of the self can be grasped, or perhaps even conceived of, unless it is in direct relation to the self, which makes for a fairly limiting viewpoint of the world. From a standpoint of absolute nothingness "for what purpose do I exist?" can be asked without withering at the idea of responsibility implicit in the question, the idea of being of use, to serve a purpose. If the responsibility is a Being rather than a Doing it has far more potential of being fulfilled. It is from here that one embarks upon the craft-task (ontotask) and by not trying to *be* anything or even *become* anything the task is able somehow to participate in a Being much larger than itself and thus breaks through the person-centred self-prehension of person which in this case is translated onto the object acting as an extension of self. The purpose of the craft-task thus has an overarching purpose far greater than the resultant object, the outcome of which can only be qualified in terms of the individual experience behind it. As may be apparent, the craft-task itself arises out of the very mode of being that engages with the question "For what purpose do I exist?" Taking Nishitani's enquiry into "What is religion?" which ultimately results in a metaphysical preponderance of Being, and applying the principles of the enquiry onto the ontotask, the same can be said here of craft-tasking as Nishitani says of the religious quest in *Religion and Nothingness*. Whilst setting religion apart from "things like culture" and recognising its somewhat diminished status in current times – "to judge from current conditions in which many people are in fact getting along without it, it is clearly not the kind of necessity that food is" – he affirms its importance as "a must for life" for "religion has to do with life itself".⁴ Overall his approach to religion is "as the self-awareness of reality, or, more correctly, the *real* self-awareness of reality." By this he means a process by which reality is at once realised and comes into realisation: "our ability to perceive reality means that reality realises (actualises) itself in us".⁵ Most importantly however, and most relevant to approaching or engaging with the craft-task, are his notes on understanding the essence of religion. It is here that he determines that the only way of understanding the religious quest is *through* the religious quest, in other words it cannot be understood from the outside. The understanding must come from within the individual and the approach is from the inside out. I do not wish to imply that craft-tasking is a quest to understanding religion, nor is it an


3 Ibid., 70.

4 Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 2.

5 Ibid., 5.

individual religious quest, but it can be read laid neatly out over what Nishitani sets down as the religious quest, as summarised above.

The task does not offer a conclusion (nor solution), it is an endless task, infinite, immeasurable, like a precarious bridge that floats unhinged, always between, suggesting a path but to nowhere, the only promise of fulfillment being to simply leap off. The task *itself* is neither the fulfillment of this promise nor its end point.



The ontotask announces its irrationalities in a formless form to iterate what it can only simulate and define by non-definition. It is the language of peculiarities that Paolo Zellini describes when he speaks of "configurations that defy any rational rigour".⁶ The

6 Paolo Zellini, *A Brief History of Infinity* (London: Penguin, 2004), 78. Zellini, on the other hand, configures a rigorous circumnavigation of the infinite as it appears in its many varied reasonings and understandings of non-understanding throughout history's own many varied understandings. The above quote refers specifically to the "art of 'learned ignorance' espoused by Nicholas of Cusa" who, among others, (about 600 years ago) re-introduced infinitesimals into the language of mathematics and in so doing destabilised equational proofing and instead *pointed towards* "antinomies that form a continual reference to the ineffable absolute".

ontolotask has the ability to initiate a state of hypnotic reverie akin to a meditative daze (or transcendence depending on the single point focus ability of the tasker). The mind is aided by the continuous activity to actually free itself from the stultifying and unending dullness of mundane thought by occupying itself with an unendingly dull task. The result of the craft-task thus essentially becomes a state rather than an action or product although conversely both action and resultant product are needed to achieve this state. Doing has a transformative principle at work within it regardless of what is being done; it is a being-in-doing.⁷

Once the mind (task) has stopped its fruitless threshing around to grasp itself⁸, (“where, in our attempts to grasp the self, we get caught in its grasp”⁹) says Nishitani, explaining the turn away from a self-centred mode of being in order to re-orientate ourselves to the “middle” of things) it approaches a unity of being that extends out beyond itself and settles in a knowing of non-knowing. Boundaries wobble in a sfumato formlessness, a light of dappled dazzle soaks and absorbs, and our abiding and tenacious grasp is weakened as we dissolve into a form of non-form (all this from the ontolotask). As Derrida traces the origins of language through a lingering of carbon and a vestigial flotsam of the unspoken, he happens upon “a concentration of light as a result of seeing in order not to see”.¹⁰ Perhaps this is the light of true seeing, a light immanent in all things and that is seen only from the centre of the very thing itself, from its “middle”, which in fact cannot be seen, in the usual sense of the word, at all. This star of disproportionate magnitude, this concentration of light, that bedazzles us with its transcendent phosphorescence, also touches Nishitani’s knowing of non-knowing with its radiant glow. Indeed, for Nishitani, they are the very same thing: “What we call the knowing of non-knowing is, as it were, the gathering together and concentration on a single point of the light of all things.”¹¹ This *docta ignorantia* has associations with the thinking of Nicholas of Cusa in the writings of both Kitaro Nishida and Nishitani. Nishida applies the *via negativa* of Nicholas of Cusa to articulate a quality of absolute

nothingness in the idea of God. The *via negativa* works by the principle that everything that can be grasped or affirmed is finite, and cannot therefore perform the infinite activity of unifying the universe. Nishida is quick to affirm that this does not mean God is mere nothingness, but absolute nothingness.



The task is a facilitator only; when it is considered in isolation, in reference to itself and its own development etc., it is no longer relevant or useful. It becomes grounded in its materiality and ceases to point past itself and thus becomes an unsatisfactory means to get somewhere or gain something. The task as facilitator is positioned in the “middle” between illusion and emptiness. Here the distinction should be made between what Nishitani refers to as “middle” which is the homeground of being in one’s own “suchness”, where one would encounter a thing in its own mode of being and the illusion to Nietzsche’s “ring” to which this “middle” refers. The “ring” of Nietzsche is a boundary between nothingness that surrounds the “will to power” (the world within it). The ring itself is without will and is the “middle” between emptiness and illusion. The ring, according to Derrida, is also “the name Nietzsche gives to the possibility of this otherpossibility”.¹² This other possibility is a beginning, but an unending beginning, that of eternal recurrence.

¹² Jacques Derrida, *Cinders*, trans. and ed. by Ned Lu-kacher (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 6. Press, 1991), 6.

⁷ The term “being-in-doing” is here coined but is, however, a specific reference to the term “being-at-doing” of Nishitani Keiji which he thoroughly explains in *Religion and Nothingness*, and which I have also adopted, using it to fortify the nebulous question of what the ontolotask is and does.

⁸ Chikao Fujisawa, *Zen & Shinto; The Story of Japanese Philosophy*, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), 74.

⁹ Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 140.

¹⁰ Derrida, *Cinders*, 75, see footnote 12.

¹¹ Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 140.

It is not a foolish pursuit to think that tasking can lead to a transcendent state or command the mind to a degree that it overcomes itself, but it would be foolish to think that it is the resultant product or object of the task that achieves this. On the other hand, when the being of doing engages with the something of nothing then there **is** a chance. Thus it is the act that enables but only without attachment to the product, which is of potentially increasing challenge as its quantity increases respectively. The task thereby presents the challenge of non-attachment and as quantity and quality increases the more easily it disguises itself as something valuable and worthwhile and the more challenging non-attachment becomes.

The task **can** be an avoidance that guises itself as progress which is also addictive because of the phenomenon of physical attachment, but it can also be a means by which a complete and conscious awareness of the moment can be experienced: an eternal now, the atomic moments of eternity, or "suchness". By "suchness" in this instance, I mean Chikao Fujisawa's idea of an eternal now derived from a strictly Buddhist teaching which describes "suchness" in a context of spatial temporality, specifically where "the verticality of time convergingly meets the horizontality of space."¹³ This differs quite dramatically from Nishitani's usage of the same term, whereby he is referring to a quintessential being encountered at the core of all things. There is, however, quite a distinct correlative presence of the notion of "middle" in both uses of the term. In the Buddhist teaching that Fujisawa follows, the thinking behind "suchness" is an assertion of Naka-Ima or Middle-Now.¹⁴ For Nishitani, being in the "middle" is "a mode of being in which a thing is on its own home-ground"¹⁵, in other words, in its true suchness. The endless task can be thought of as a representation of life within the confining and distorting paradigm of space and time through which we normally see and experience everything. If one is able to be in the task, to encounter it in its "middle", then it is a constant arrival rather than an infinite

13 Chikao Fujisawa, *Zen & Shinto: The Story of Japanese Philosophy*, 12. Fujisawa is a neo-shintologist, who, in an attempt to enlighten Western thinking bound by a historicised mythology laid down by a Judeo-Christian heritage, reveals his patriotic leanings towards the wisdom of traditional thought in 'old' Japan, along with a deep-seated cynicism towards Western philosophical endeavour, which he considers can only be overcome by "plucking from the refreshing fruits of eastern thought". He considers the orientation of Western thinking that divides religious spirituality from scientific materiality a "fatal malady of schizophrenia".

14 Ibid., 12

15 Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 139.

avoidance. It is being-in-doing rather than doing-to-avoid-being, or doing-at-being.

What Nishitani calls being-at-doing, or "samskṛta", is a condition of our nature of being in time. He adorns the concept in a heavy garb of tarnished mail that is, "an interminable burden"; indeed, "infinitely burdensome"; it is "an inexhaustible debt" with which we are "saddled" and if ever we manage to purge ourselves of one debt through sheer dogged obstinacy, it would only serve to change the scenery of our endless toil through time as "anything we do invariably results in a new liability and imposes the obligation of doing something else. Thus in the very act of working constantly to pay off our debt, another obligation is added on".

It is not hard to read Beckett in this rather crushing dictum of our incarceration. Beckett is well aware that "there is no escape from the hours and the days", and he too colours the view with a sombre palette in which we, the subjects, or "lower organisms, conscious of only two dimensions" are "victims and prisoners".¹⁶ The idea of being-at-doing, which encapsulates the ineluctable perpetuity of existence on the converging axis of time and space, "together with the causal nexus it implies"¹⁷ and more precisely the constant doing that being in such a condition requires, are inextricably bound in what Nishitani calls (borrowing an expression from the "ancients") a "causal kinship" at the bottom of which lies *incessant becoming*.

incessant becoming

By itself, the term, *incessant becoming*, is nearly enough to inspire apoplectic seizures of dread. How better to confess the sin of time upon being than with the word *incessant*? With what better effect could the interminable burden of being in time be disclosed?

Incessant becoming calls out in purgatorial camaraderie with Nietzsche's eternal return which tortures the penitent with a cyclonic vertigo. It is a well-worn tirade that bemoans the on and ongoing, the bondage of diurnal routine, the sameness that seems to stretch out as far as history has stretched its mythical arm, but with a slight tweaking of hue, blood red to Moulin rouge. It is not, however, such a highway of travellers that take refuge on the way in "the *nothingness* that is

16 Samuel Beckett, *Proust and 3 Dialogues with Georges Duthuit* (London: John Calder, 1965), 12-13.

17 Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 221.

one with being within incessant becoming in time."¹⁸ Possibly because nothingness is not normally thought of in terms of a refuge, but as still further reason for despair. Despair is nothing but the flag bearer, a great luminous beacon sending out its warning signal that the gnashing crags of relativity are hidden in the tempest of its own doom. Relative nothingness is the forebearer of such gloom if it is contemplated in isolation, that is, without consideration of its *relativity*.

There is a purposefulness about the task's purposelessness. It is for this reason that the task can only point to what it is stating, for it cannot *be* what it speaks of. It is not pretending to be more (nor less) than it is, it must not.

As soon as the task presumes to be something it falls away from nothingness and into nihilism. The task is tentatively balanced between what it is not and what it can only suggest, symbolically and representationally, for absolute nothingness cannot be expressed **by** an object but only **through** an object.



It is not the working towards something, in general, nor a particular form of *thing*, that is the motivator or director of the task. It is more about enabling and allowing something else entirely to occur, and this may have absolutely nothing to do with the task at hand. This could easily be misconstrued as a separation that takes away from the presence of being in the doing as the task itself seems to be a guise or mask – but this is not at all so. It is often the distraction of doing that allows the presence of being to register. Nishitani would go so far as to say that “we are because we produce time ourselves as the field of our transitory becoming”. This field of our transitory becoming is nothing other than doing. What he is suggesting is that being and *doing* are intricately bound in a symbiotic determination.

18 Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 241.

An active enquiry into, or experience of, the purpose of the task opens up a seemingly gaping void between an apparent meaning invested in **being** and a meaninglessness wrested from an **incessant becoming**. The leap from object to ontological enquiry is active in the ontotask because of its refusal to be object only, because it insists on being looked *through*. Whilst the task may imply an impasse it also provides a look-out. From a “person-centred self-prehension of person” beyond what one understands of the self one *cannot* understand, which is from whither the ontotask issues forth but also, where it is *awaying* from. What the task is looking out at or towards is a reality beyond empirical materiality, beyond causality and even consciousness, a non-objectifiable reality that is neither a subjective experience nor even an awareness that can in any way be directed back to a reflecting self, but more of an infinite void from which all impossibilities are made possible without anything actually happening or existing. A boundless dominion of shimmering isness that slips past the senses but imprints a seamless and seenless mark, a fluttering intuited through a peripheral guessing and “knowing of non-knowing” – a non-objective knowing.

To say the task is “looking out at” indicates that the task looks *out* from *within* itself. Firstly, when I speak of the task as if it is a subject looking out, that is because I mean to use it as a metaphor for the looking subject (though looking does not imply seeing, indeed, more often the contrary) and this also means the task is positioned, like the *cogito*, at the centre of its own world and is then inevitably eclipsed by its own reflection. Any pointing towards or looking out will therefore do no more than scribe a firm arc of rigid axis, unless the trajectory of the gaze is focused inwards to come out on the other side, truly leaving the self (task), so to speak, behind. Taking on the idea of an “existential conversion” that Nishitani advocates, which entails leaving behind the mode of being of person-centred person, the task (marauding as person), offers a passage that traverses the great vacant plains of “nothing at all”¹⁹ apprehended behind person to come up on the “near-side” of person from the “far-side”. Following the process of conversion, Nishitani explains that the “arrival at the far side” is preceded by a profound realisation of the emptiness of the self, and thus “we can maintain not merely a far side that is beyond us, but a far side that we have arrived at”, which he qualifies as “an absolute near side.”²⁰

19 Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 70.

20 *Ibid.*, 138.

In a poignant circumnavigation of himself within the world, Mr Palomar, the reticent protagonist of Italo Calvino's *Mr Palomar*, attempts to view the world from outside of himself, in other words from the far-side. Taken from "The Meditations of Palomar", the following passage uncannily describes an experience of what one might encounter when grappling with the existential conversion Nishitani requests in order to arrive at "an absolute near side".

But how can you look at something and set your own ego aside? Whose eyes are doing the looking? As a rule, you think of the ego as one who is peering out of your own eyes as if leaning on a windowsill, looking at the world stretching out before him in all its immensity. So then: there is a window that looks out on the world. The world is out there; and in here, what is there? The world still – what else could there be? With a little effort of concentration Palomar manages to shift the world from in front of him and set it on the sill, looking out. The world is also there, and for the occasion has been split into a looking world and a world looked at. And what about him, also known as 'I', namely Mr Palomar? Is he not a piece of the world that is looking at another piece of world? Or else, given that there is world that side of the window and world this side, perhaps the I, the ego, is simply the window through which the world looks at the world. To look at itself the world needs the eyes (and the eyeglasses) of Mr Palomar. So from now on Mr Palomar will look at things from outside and not from inside. But this is not enough: he will look at them with a gaze that comes from outside, not inside, himself.²¹

Sadly for Mr Palomar, after this Herculean effort, and in full expectation of "general transfiguration" he is greeted with "the usual quotidian grayness"²². It is this disappointment that spurns him towards a reconfiguration of the problem, resulting in the decision that: "Having the outside look outside is not enough: the trajectory must start from the looked-at thing, linking it with the thing that looks".²³ And in so deciding, he unwittingly expounds the idea of encountering something on its own home-ground, its "middle". Surely Mr Palomar would have been greeted with applause from his present audience of Nishida, Nishitani and Beckett. All of them in their own ways have taken a particular opposition to the

usual, albeit often oblivious, assertion of a subject-object dichotomy. However, even if Mr Palomar manages to look from the thing being looked at to the thing looking, presumably himself, which would indicate he has truly become one with the object, he has not actually arrived at the far side. In accordance with the concept given to us by Nishitani, the far side is an "outside" or "beyond", something unobtainable and unapproachable, so to *arrive* there already means it is somehow on our *near side*, which is, more or less, when Nishitani calls it "an absolute near side." It seems that this is what Mr Palomar intended to do, but his disappointment in the "usual quotidian grayness" is quite a clear indication that this did not happen. If he had arrived, there would certainly be no need for *looking* for a start, and the fact that he is gauging his success with the eye of an observer means that whether he had arrived or not, he wouldn't have actually intended to. Furthermore, in the echo of applause, his overcoming of the subject-object dichotomy has regrettably been less than convincing, for he has not managed to escape the *cogito*, or as Beckett puts it in *Proust*: "Nor is any direct and purely experimental contact possible between subject and object, because they are automatically separated by the subject's consciousness of perception."²⁴ However, (before I threaten to dismiss the metaphysical exertions of Mr Palomar altogether, which I simply never would), Mr Palomar does furnish us with generous provision of the substantial difficulties of looking through the self, so as to not be caught constantly in the mirror of its reflection. His enquiries are not in fact the pontifications of a solipsistic ascetic (as much as his apparent social ineptitudes suggest); they are speculations that travel in the company of many. It is a fine party of conjecture, hypothesis, experiment, prayer, klangs, bangs, poetry and above all, modern dance. Aristotle adds a fulcrum of thought to the precarious ledge of Palomar's window viewing:

...And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same.²⁵

Incessant becoming resides in every being as nothing less than life itself. In the words of Beckett "here is all humanity circling with fatal monotony about the Providential fulcrum", or in other words, the words

21 Italo Calvino, *Mr Palomar*, trans. William Weaver. (London: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1994), 102.

22 *Ibid.*, 102.

23 *Ibid.*, 102.

24 Beckett, *Proust*, 74.

25 David H Hesla, *The Shape of Chaos: An Interpretation of the Art of Samuel Beckett* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 81.

of Joyce this time, the “convoy wheeling encircling around the gigantig’s lifetree”.²⁶



In *Nadja*, André Breton’s celebrated Surrealist novel of 1928, the image of “ghost” introduces the narrator as a haunting of his own being. A being that perhaps through the exigencies of an existence “whose true extent is quite unknown to me”, is whittled away by “a torment that may be eternal”. There is no sense of an infinite freedom that this constant re-newal could mean in the shadowy existence that Breton laments: “perhaps I am doomed to retrace my steps under the illusion that I am exploring, doomed to try and learn what I should simply recognise, learning a mere fraction of what I have forgotten.”²⁷

In Beckett’s trilogy of *Molloy*, *Malone Dies* and *The Unnamable*, there is a progressive disintegration of characters, of persona, of the mask of persona. In the final novel, *The Unnamable*, Beckett over-writes the characters of the preceding novels, dismissing them as the fiction they are – destroying the superficialities of reality, which are all constructed fictions, to reveal the nothingness behind them: a place of non-identity. But it all stops there, this is not freedom; it is the ultimate entrapment, that is the despair. Lights go out, do not turn on, in *The Unnamable*:

And there is nothing for it but to wait for the end, nothing but for the end to come, and at the end all will be the same, at the end at last perhaps all the same as before...the nuisance of doing over, and of being, same thing, for one who could never do, never be.²⁸

The end is the greatest illusion of all though, and if ever we were to slither away momentarily from the trickle of infinity irrigating the finitude of life, so that each ending is but the seed of a new beginning, it would not be with the aid of Beckett:

You must go on, I can’t go on, you must go on, I’ll

²⁶ Ibid., 25.

²⁷ Samuel Beckett, “Dante...Bruno...Vico...Joyce”, 12.

²⁸ Samuel Beckett, *The Unnamable* from *The Beckett Trilogy* (London: John Calder, 1976), 341.

go on, you must say words, as long as there are any, until they find me, until they say me,...perhaps they have said me already, perhaps they have carried me to the threshold of my story...I’ll never know, in the silence you don’t know, you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on.²⁹

Maurice Blanchot says that perhaps Beckett’s work must exist always at a point somewhere between being and non-being where it is in a state of “perpetual unworkableness” where “the work must maintain an increasingly initial relation or risk becoming nothing at all”.³⁰ In this critique “becoming nothing at all” is still considered a risk and not an aim. This fear, yes, I will call it a fear, can only come from a perspective of relative nothingness, grounded in nihilism. What Blanchot is also saying is that as soon as the work becomes *something* it loses that insightful balance between becoming and being, that Delphic bridge between past and future. If, in the finality of a conclusive form, the work ceases to exist because it ceases to indicate, to initiate, then it would be nothing at all. For it is in his own “punctuation of dehiscence” (that Beckett attributes to Beethoven, where form destroys form), that the real somethingness of Beckett’s work lies.

From within the mode of being that is an incessant becoming, like a quiet but shrill drone of a dawn trumpet an epitaph of meaninglessness is re-membered to us, sent by the vaporous seraphim of nothingness whose call forever echoes in our doings. The ineluctable perpetuity, the sheer unabating existence of life itself, means that any doing whose ultimate value lies in an end or completion suddenly has very third rate seats, quite in the wings, hardly a view of the stage at all. The ontolotask in a promotion of its own meaninglessness paradoxically assumes a role of preserving the dignity of all those engaged in meaningless activity, which from this viewpoint is in fact everybody.





²⁹ Samuel Beckett, *The Unnamable* from *The Beckett Trilogy*, 381. John Fletcher, *The Novels of Samuel Beckett* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), 181.

³⁰ See John Fletcher, *The Novels of Samuel Beckett* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), 181.



“Where there are people, it is said, there are things”.³¹

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31 Samuel Beckett, *The Unnamable* from *The Beckett Trilogy* (London: John Calder, 1976), 268.